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INTRODUCTION
How much capital should a bank have? There was a time,
not too long ago, when the answer to this question seemed
simple, at least to some. Then came floating exchange
rates, oil shocks, global inflation, swaps, inverse floaters,
and other tribulations, and the answer seemed not to be so
simple after all. Regulators responded in kind with more
complicated formulas; they introduced risk weights,
credit-equivalent amounts, potential future exposures,
maturity buckets, and disallowances. How does this story
end, and what is the moral of the story? Were things ever
really simple? Do we have more confidence now in the
accuracy of the capital assessments?
We must bear in mind two important facts in
order to address those questions. First, regulatory capital
has never been a mindless game played with simple
mechanical formulas. Second, firms themselves have used a
changing array of prevailing practices to develop their own
estimates of the level of capital they should have. To be
sure, mistakes have been made, but those mistakes
typically have not resulted from thoughtless reliance on
mechanical formulas.
This paper focuses on the relative emphasis that
the structure of regulatory capital places on formulas and
on supervision. The two are not viewed as mutually exclu-
sive, but as elements to which capital policy implicitly
assigns relative weights. We will see that in U.S. regula-
tory practice, these weights have shifted over time, not
always in the same direction. Furthermore, we will explore
the relationships among regulatory formulas, supervisory
appraisals, and the prevailing business practices in the
banking industry.1 We then ask, what is the appropriate
mix of formulas and supervision?
Why is this an important issue? Consider three
related reasons. First, there is a risk of an increasing discon-
nect between regulatory capital and what banks and other
financial institutions do. The last few decades have brought
tremendous changes in the nature of financial firms, their
activities, and their approaches to risk management. In
such an environment, past regulatory achievements provide
no guarantee of future success. Second, for much the same
reasons, inertia will almost surely lead regulators down the
wrong path. Steady progress in a given direction is not
enough if the business has a tendency to change course—to
innovate. Third, banks and other institutions are in danger
of being over- or underregulated as the business changes
course. Overregulation can thwart a useful economic role
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faith in the financial sector and dampen its role as a catalyst
for economic progress.
The issues considered here are difficult and funda-
mental, and they seem resistant to an approach based solely
on straightforward economic analysis. Therefore, this article
makes use of a variety of tools: analytical, historical,
doxographical. We examine the rationale for capital reg-
ulation; the history of regulatory capital in the United
States, including current and proposed approaches to
regulatory capital; and the expressed views of practitioners
and theorists.
To preview the results, the principal conclusion is
a reaffirmation of the benefits of informed supervision.
Mechanical formulas may play a role in regulation, but
they are in general incapable of providing a solution to the
question of how much capital a bank should have. At the
margin, scarce public resources are better employed to
enhance supervision than to develop new formulas whose
payoff may be largely illusory.
ASSUMPTIONS OF REGULATORY 
CAPITAL POLICY
We examine in this section the basic reasoning that under-
lies regulatory capital as we observe it in practice. One
conclusion to be drawn from the existing academic litera-
ture on this topic is that it is difficult to define—let alone
compute—the right level of capital for an arbitrary institu-
tion.2 In the end, the problem is so complicated and the
technical tools so limited that reasonable persons may have
substantial disagreements about the right amount of
capital that a given firm should hold.
Since it is impossible to “prove” that there is any
one right approach to regulatory capital, and since support
for any approach must ultimately rest on some ungrounded
propositions, I attempt here simply to list a series of
assumptions that are likely to be representative of the
thinking behind existing systems of regulatory capital. The
structure provided by this inventory can then serve as a
backdrop for the discussion of specific aspects of the regu-
latory capital framework.
Consider first some very general assumptions
concerning the rationale for capital. These assumptions are
relatively noncontroversial and are probably widely held.
1. Capital can help protect the safety and soundness
of individual institutions.
2. Capital can help protect the safety and soundness
of the financial system.
3. Supervisors can play a socially useful role by moni-
toring the capital levels of financial institutions.
Support for assumptions 1 and 2 may be found in
Berger, Herring, and Szegö (1995) and in many of the ref-
erences contained in that paper. Assumption 3 may be
slightly less straightforward, particularly if an extreme
“free market” point of view is adopted. Nevertheless, it
seems likely that most observers would admit that the
capital decisions of individual institutions may produce
externalities and that an impartial public-sector supervisor
with enforcement powers can play a useful monitoring role.
The following assumptions involve the appropriate
levels of capital more directly, or the means of estimating
such levels. Most of these assumptions are likely to have
been maintained in the framing of capital requirements at
one time or another.
4. There is some level of capital that is consistent
with the interests of the firm and the regulatory
and supervisory objectives of safety and soundness.
Call this the optimum level of capital.
5. The optimum level of capital can be estimated
with reasonable accuracy.
6. A lower bound for the optimum level of capital
can be computed from a mechanical formula.
7. An accurate estimate of the optimum level of capi-
tal can be computed from a mechanical formula.
Assumption 4 strikes a balance between the objec-
tives of the firm and those of regulators, which in general
are not identical.3 In assumptions 6 and 7, note that the
term “mechanical formula” does not presuppose that the
formula is simple, but only that it be computable in a
mechanical way, for instance, by means of a computer
program. Explicit regulatory capital requirements in the
United States and in most other industrial countries are
consistent with assumption 6. In fact, the 1988 Basle
Accord (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 1988)
states that: “It should be stressed that the agreed frame-
work is designed to establish minimum levels of capital for
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Assumption 7 is more controversial. The Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), for example, is
careful to point out that its measure is in no way optimal.
The committee emphasizes “that capital adequacy as mea-
sured by the present framework, though important, is one
of a number of factors to be taken into account when assess-
ing the strength of banks.” Of course, the fact that one
specific formula is not sufficiently accurate does not rule
out that other, more accurate formulas may exist.
If assumptions 1 through 7 all held, there would be
a high degree of confidence in the well-functioning of reg-
ulatory capital. In fact, many of these assumptions are
unlikely to be controversial. Most problematic are those
assumptions that involve some knowledge of the optimum
level of capital, perhaps obtained by means of a mechanical
formula. I refrain at this point from taking a stand on the
assumptions. In a later section, I return to the issue of
whether optimum capital is calculable by means of
mechanical formulas.
U.S. REGULATORY PRACTICE 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A brief preliminary review of the history of regulatory
capital for U.S. banks may provide a helpful perspective on
the issue of the relative importance of formulas and super-
vision.4 Before 1981, there were no explicit regulatory
requirements for capital ratios. Examiners from the federal
supervisory agencies (the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
the Federal Reserve System) were responsible for formulating
opinions about the capital adequacy of individual firms.
Any formulas used differed from supervisor to supervisor,
and possibly even from bank to bank, and were conceived
as informal guidelines rather than as precise estimates of an
optimum level of capital. In terms of the structure of the
previous section, we could think of the pre-1981 regime as
embodying the first five assumptions, but not the last two.
In 1981, in the aftermath of the thrift crisis and in
the midst of widespread discontent with the actual capital
ratios of many banking institutions, a new three-tier set of
explicit capital requirements was introduced. These
requirements were based on the ratio of primary capital,
which consisted mainly of equity and loan loss reserves, to
total assets. The multi-tier framework was instituted to
facilitate the transition to the new system by larger institu-
tions, whose capital ratios were in general less than desired.
The distinctions among banks of different sizes were elimi-
nated in 1985.5 In this early period of explicit capital
requirements, we could say that regulators and supervisors
became more comfortable with assumption 6 regarding a
lower bound for optimum capital.
Toward the mid-1980s, there was again some
discontent with the levels of capital of U.S. institutions,
and once again the focus tended to be on the larger firms.
At the same time, regulators in other countries, including
the United Kingdom and Japan, had similar concerns
about their own institutions. These countries joined
forces with others in the so-called Group of 10 and issued
in 1988 the Basle Accord (Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision 1988).6
The Accord differed in two significant respects
from the structure of capital requirements then in place in
the United States. First, for the purpose of calculating
required capital, asset values were weighted by a few simple
credit risk factors. Second, the risk-weighted assets were
supplemented by credit-equivalent amounts corresponding
to off-balance-sheet instruments. The 1988 innovations
relied on the same assumptions 1 through 6 as the 1981
requirements. However, the changes reflected two new
developments. 
First, large firms were increasingly engaged in
activities that produced risky exposures not captured (or
not fully captured) on the balance sheet. This change
exposed a natural weakness of mechanical formulas: they
typically have to be adjusted when there are unforeseen
changes in the environment. The second development was,
in essence, increased confidence in assumption 6, that
is, on the precision of formulas for calculating a lower
bound for optimum capital. For example, factors corre-
sponding to potential future exposure of off-balance-sheet
instruments were based, albeit loosely, on state-of-the-art
mathematical simulation methods.
The most recent event in our chronology is the
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(1996). The 1988 Basle Accord had recognized that there
were various problems that were left unresolved for future
iterations. The 1996 rules took the ground-breaking step
of allowing banks to calculate their exposure to market
risk using their own internal models, subject to some
restrictions on the choices of parameters and features of the
model.7 As in 1988, these changes reflected increased
confidence in assumptions 1 through 6, rather than the
introduction of a new one. In 1996, the optimism centered
on assumption 5—on the accuracy with which optimum
capital could be estimated using state-of-the-art modeling
techniques.
To summarize, history demonstrates that supervi-
sion and examination have always played a major role in
regulatory capital in the United States, and that it is only
since 1981 that mechanical formulas have been used
explicitly across the board. Of the assumptions listed in the
previous section, only assumption 7 failed to be invoked
historically. However, through history, there has been a
clear recurrent fascination with the idea of reducing every-
thing to formulas, and it seems unlikely that such an ideal
has been given up at this point. In the next section, I turn
to assumption 7 or, more specifically, to the drawbacks of
mechanical formulas and to their limitations in defining
regulatory capital.
THE PROBLEMS WITH FORMULAS
The landmark Basle Accord of 1988 was issued by the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision under the
chairmanship of W.P. Cooke. The Accord relies heavily on
mechanical formulas, but it is clear from the document
that it by no means constitutes an unqualified endorsement
of formulas. In fact, a few years earlier, Cooke (1981)
had stated bluntly that “There is no objective basis for
ex-cathedra statements about levels of capital. There can be
no certainty, no dogma about capital adequacy.” This section
is an attempt to understand the limitations of mechanical
formulas.
One could easily conceive of mechanical formulas
playing a useful role in banking if the business were com-
pletely determined by formal laws that were clearly stated
and strictly implemented. In the words of legal philoso-
pher H.L.A. Hart (1994), “Everything could be known,
and for everything, since it could be known, something
could be done and specified in advance by rule. This would
be a world fit for ‘mechanical’ jurisprudence.” However,
the reality of banking is quite different: the business has
important informal determinants and conventions that
have evolved over the course of several centuries and that
continue to evolve.
Banking has developed in most countries as a
market solution to a common array of business problems.
Furthermore, not only is the institution of banking an
evolving response to economic conditions, but evolving
economic conditions are in turn profoundly affected by the
institution of banking. These mutual influences are so
important that it would be impossible, in the context of a
mature banking sector, to identify one as logically or
chronologically prior to the other.8
Fundamentally, banks and other financial firms are
social institutions. They have emerged not by external
design, but as sets of rules that rest on a social context of
common activity. These rules are not limited to formal
laws, like banking statutes and regulations, but also
include conventions that are predicated on the agreement
of the parties involved and on the existence of formal and
informal criteria that may be used to determine whether
the rules are being followed.9
Examples of informal rules abound in banking.
There is remarkable consistency in the instruments that
banks employ, even banks of different sizes and geographical
locations. Consider, for example, commercial loans. There
is some variation in the terms of these loans, such as
maturity and reference interest rates, but the choices are
typically conventional and essentially “menu-driven.”
Furthermore, even the criteria for loan approval are deter-
mined by the normal practices of the business. Other
examples of conventional instruments are consumer loans,
mortgages, demand deposits, and time deposits. Closer to
the issue of regulatory capital are conventions with regard
to risk management, such as simulation models for calcu-
lating exposures to fluctuations in market prices and, more
generally, value-at-risk models. Consensus on these tech-
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The business practices of the financial sector, and
in particular the network of informal rules and conventions
on which they are partly based, provide a certain level of
consistency, but they are also dynamic and complex. A
supervisory or regulatory regime that ignores these prac-
tices will fail to deal with the economic reasons for the
existence of the financial sector and, if the restrictions are
binding or even relevant, the regime will create economic
distortions and inefficiencies that will make everyone
worse off. Consider in turn the implications of dynamism
and complexity.
There is no question that the financial sector is
dynamic. Commons ([1934] 1990) anticipated later observ-
ers in noting that “Working rules are continually chang-
ing in the history of an institution.” And North (1990),
drawing on historical observations, contends that “The
stability of institutions in no way gainsays the fact that
they are changing. From conventions, codes of conduct,
and norms of behavior to statute law, and common law,
and contracts between individuals, institutions are evolv-
ing and, therefore, are continually altering the choices
available to us.”
How can we rely on static formulas if they have to
be applied to a business that is continually changing?
Obviously, the only way to keep pace is to change the for-
mulas. However, predictability in regulation is helpful,
perhaps essential. What happens if, in an effort to keep up
with the dynamism of banking, inflexible regulatory
regimes have to be modified at an increasing pace? There is
a tradeoff between predictability and dynamism, and there
is a danger that changes are now (and will continue to be)
required with increasing frequency.
Let us turn to the issue of complexity. The very
fact that an activity is based on informal rules brings with
it some degree of complexity. North (1990) contends that:
It is much easier to describe and be precise about
the formal rules that societies devise than to
describe and be precise about the informal ways by
which human beings have structured human
interaction. But although they defy, for the most
part, neat specification and it is extremely difficult
to develop unambiguous tests of their significance,
they are important.
To be sure, one of the reasons for the complexity of
informal rules is that they have not been written down, or
formalized. However, the problem is not simply that they
have not been specified, but rather that they defy specifi-
cation. Behind the network of routine practices of the
business lurks a system of true inherent complexity.
So, where do we turn? A decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States (1933) may be useful in provid-
ing some sense of direction.10 In referring to the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act of 1890, the Court stated that
As a charter of freedom in the public interest, the
act has a generality and adaptability comparable to
that found to be desirable in constitutional provi-
sions. It does not go into detailed definitions
which might either work injury to legitimate
enterprise or through particularization defeat its
purposes by providing loopholes for escape. The
restrictions the act imposes are not mechanical or
artificial.
Abstracting from the specific legal issue facing the Court
on that occasion, the general economic principles are close
in spirit to those that we address here. The suggestions are
clear: strive for generality and adaptability in statute and
regulation, avoid detailed definitions that may be ineffi-
cient and circumventable, stay away from the mechanical
or artificial.
Do we want to say, in conclusion, that there is no
role for mechanical formulas in regulatory capital? No, that
would be dogmatic and inflexible. Even if formulas are
problematic as constraints on banks’ decisions, they may
still be useful in some circumstances, for instance, to con-
vey certain kinds of information about the bank or to make
some interbank comparisons. We do not want, however, to
be unreasonably restrained by lingering mechanical formu-
las for years or decades at a time. It therefore seems advis-
able to avoid writing detailed mechanical formulas into
statute and possibly even into regulation.
WHAT ELSE IS THERE?
If mechanical formulas hold very little promise of identify-
ing appropriate levels of regulatory capital, what else is
there for regulators to turn to? In announcing the sweeping
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place in the United Kingdom in 1997, Sir Andrew Large
(1997) indicated that “I don’t think we should lose sight of
the fact that so much in regulation is not about structure
but about attitude and management: the ‘how’ of regula-
tion; the way it is done.” The implications for regulatory
capital seem clear. It is an important priority of supervisors
to determine whether the appropriate “attitude and man-
agement” toward capital prevail in a firm, to focus on the
way things are done. It is less clear that they need to pro-
vide the firm with mechanical formulas to estimate the
appropriate level of capital.
Yet mechanical formulas produce tangible results,
whereas attitude and management seem quite fuzzy. If we
were to rely less on formulas, is there any substitute for the
determinacy they seem to provide, or are we inevitably
thrust into an environment in which there are no guide-
posts and only discretion prevails? This is potentially a
serious difficulty, certainly in practical terms, but espe-
cially in view of the arguable importance for authorities to
commit in advance to certain types of behavior in order to
avoid problems of moral hazard and time inconsistency.11
However, in banking, there is a network of informal con-
straints—as described in the preceding section—that can
provide a solid grounding for the capital decisions of firms
and the informed judgment of supervisors.
These informal constraints or conventions are also
useful in dealing with moral hazard and time consistency
problems. Although formal economic models often imply
that mechanical rules are necessary for those purposes,
Williamson (1983) and North (1990), among others, con-
clude that conventions are sufficient to achieve “credible
commitments” in real-world situations. A particularly
relevant case is presented by North and Weingast (1989).
They argue that, following the Glorious Revolution in
seventeenth-century England, the Crown and Parliament
agreed to abide by credible commitments that led to new
institutional arrangements. These new institutions, in
turn, made possible the development of modern financial
markets.
The foregoing considerations suggest that, in
designing regulatory capital requirements, it is desirable to
avoid excessive detail in statute and regulation. However,
to determine how much capital a bank should have, detail
is ultimately unavoidable. One solution to this regulatory
dilemma is to ensure both that firms delve into whatever
level of detail is necessary and that supervisors have the
necessary expertise to determine whether the details are
properly handled by the firm. In terms of the initial ques-
tion of this paper, less weight could be placed on the devel-
opment of mechanical formulas, and more weight could be
devoted to supervision.
We should note that, in this regard, there is no
immediate cause for alarm. The principal concerns, however,
are not with the present, but with the future evolution of the
system. How do we make further progress, and how do we
avoid allowing the dynamic environment to elude us?
Let us review a couple of recent ideas. First, con-
sider the “pre-commitment approach,” an attempt to do
away with mechanical formulas for the calculation of capi-
tal for market risk and to replace them with penalties for
firms whose decisions are proven wrong by experience.12
Under this approach, firms pre-commit a certain amount of
capital for market risk at the beginning of, say, each quar-
ter. This amount may be determined by whatever means
the firm sees fit. At the end of the quarter, the supervisor
compares the firm’s losses arising from market risk, if any,
with the pre-committed amount. If the loss exceeds the
amount, a penalty of some sort is imposed. Kupiec and
O’Brien (1995b) consider a broad range of possible penal-
ties, from monetary fines to supervisory disclosures.
The pre-commitment approach is attractive for
several reasons. First, it provides considerable flexibility in
the determination of capital amounts. Second, it is not
intrusive; it is designed to allow the firm to pursue its
business objectives with few distortionary effects from reg-
ulation. Third, it seems to require little knowledge or
effort on the part of the supervisor. With regard to banks’
internal models, Kupiec and O’Brien (1995a) argue that
“It is virtually impossible for a regulator to verify the accu-
racy of the size of the losses associated with rare tail
events.” They propose instead the easier task of comparing
actual losses with a pre-committed amount.
Though theoretically attractive, there are serious
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approach. One central issue is the design of the penalty
structure. The approach circumvents the need for mechani-
cal formulas in the initial determination of capital, but reg-
ulators must address the need for a “penalty formula” at the
other end. Should this be a mechanical formula, which
might suffer from the shortcomings described in the previ-
ous section? Should there be room for supervisory discre-
tion? Some proponents of the method might be put off by
the introduction of discretion in a method conceived as
objective and nondiscretionary. There are also other, more
mundane issues, such as defining what is meant by “the
firm’s losses arising from market risk.” Thus, the pre-com-
mitment approach is basically attractive, but is not with-
out its share of practical problems.
Another idea from the recent literature is what we
might call the “supervisory approach,” whose rationale is to
focus primarily on the determination of optimum capital
by the firm, monitored by the supervisor, while limiting
reliance on mechanical formulas to a simple, well-defined
role in which they are more likely to be useful.13 Under
this approach, the firm would be accountable in the first
instance for determining its own appropriate level of capi-
tal, abiding by sound practices developed in the context of
the business. Firms engaged in trading of complex finan-
cial instruments, for example, would need to apply sophis-
ticated mathematical techniques, which they would be
required by supervisors to have at any rate for risk manage-
ment purposes. Firms that focus on small business lending
would have to apply very different techniques, most likely
emphasizing more traditional credit analysis.
The supervisor would monitor the performance of
the firm in the determination of the appropriate level of
capital. There is substantial potential synergy between the
supervisory review of risk management activities, which is
already an important part of bank examinations, and the
monitoring of regulatory capital in the way described. Fur-
thermore, the attention paid by supervisors to the process,
not just to the final result, provides incentives for firms to
refine their management of risk. In monitoring the deter-
mination of capital, the supervisors would also ensure that
the views of the firm are consistent with the public goals of
systemic safety and soundness, and that there is no attempt
to take undue advantage of elements of the financial safety
net, such as deposit insurance. Procedures to enforce com-
pliance through supervisory sanctions would have to be in
place, much as they are now in the United States and other
countries.
Finally, mechanical formulas could be retained in a
relatively modest role as rough indicators of severely inade-
quate capital. If an institution were to require closure, it is
in the public interest to prevent any losses from having to
be borne ultimately by taxpayers. A formula may be help-
ful in this regard as a trigger point, much in the same way
that prompt corrective action regulation is implemented
for U.S. banks.
One important issue in the supervisory approach is
that it places a substantial burden both on firms and super-
visors. Firms have to be ready to take the necessary steps to
make an accurate assessment of their need for capital. For
many of them, reliance on mechanical formulas would not
be an option. Supervisors would have to develop and retain
human and other resources that would enable them to
come to grips with the full diversity of methods employed
by firms.
The supervisory approach is in many ways similar
to the system in place in the United States prior to 1981,
which regulators in the end found unsatisfactory. However,
the similarities are only superficial, because a broad array of
new conventions has been introduced in the financial mar-
kets since 1981. For instance, in the 1970s, many financial
institutions were caught off guard by sudden bursts of
inflation and sharp rises in interest rates, and the magni-
tude of the resulting losses was staggering. Today, even the
smallest institutions are aware of interest rate risk and are
required by supervisors to manage it prudently. In general,
firms and regulators are much more cognizant today of risk
and risk management, and this awareness has led to a
whole structure of conventions designed to deal flexibly
with new risks as they are identified.
The approaches to regulatory capital described
above are only two examples of methods that can help
effect a shift from mechanical formulas to supervision in
the context of regulatory capital. As these and other poten-
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ate them? Toward this goal, we conclude with the
following series of questions, which are based on the analy-
sis of this paper.
• Does the idea make sense in principle? Does it address
the shortcomings of the current system and is it based
on sound theoretical analysis?
• What are the practical implications of implementa-
tion? What exactly is required on the part of the insti-
tution and on the part of supervisors?
• Is it a short-term fix or a long-term solution? Is it
capable of handling new instruments and practices? 
• Is it applicable to the institution as a whole? Would
other different—and potentially inconsistent—
approaches have to be developed for other risks or
other parts of the business?ENDNOTES
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1. Although most of the discussion of this paper focuses on banks, the
principles delineated also apply to other types of financial institutions
that perform similar services.  The focus on banks is adopted to make the
analysis more concrete, especially since history is one of the main tools
employed in the paper. For similar reasons, examples are drawn mostly
from the U.S. experience.
2. For example, see Berger, Herring, and Szegö (1995) and
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). Historical approaches to banking crises
include Bernanke (1983) and Mishkin (1991), whereas Davis (1992) and
Calomiris and Gorton (1991) combine theoretical and historical analysis.
3. The Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem implies that under certain
ideal conditions, the firm would not have a preference for any
determinate level of capital. However, see also Berger, Herring, and
Szegö (1995), and Miller (1995).
4. See Gaske (1995), Berger, Herring, and Szegö (1995), and Kaufman
(1991).
5. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1985).
6. An account of the process that led to the Basle Accord is found in
Bardos (1987-88).
7. The model-based rules are described in detail in Hendricks and
Hirtle (1997).
8. An interesting attempt to model these types of mutual influences is
found in Caplin and Nalebuff (1997).
9. In this paper, the terms “rules,” “formulas,” and “models” have very
different meanings, as the usage in the text demonstrates. Rules are
interpreted quite generally to include conventions and other practices
that are generally followed in the course of business but are not formally
prescribed, for example, by statute or regulation. Mechanical formulas
include mathematical expressions, but more generally any formula that
can be constructed, for example, by means of a computer program and
therefore that can be computed without human judgment or
intervention. Finally, models refers to mathematical techniques applied
to a specific problem, say, to the estimation of optimum capital for a
given bank. These models may include, among others, value-at-risk
models for calculating market risk of trading portfolios.
10. I am grateful to Arturo Estrella, Sr., for this reference.
11. See, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1977).
12. See Kupiec and O’Brien (1995b).
13. Some thoughts on how a regulatory approach could be designed are
found in Estrella (1995).
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